Why BTCGOLD Has No Passwords: Passkeys and Magic Links Only
Passwords get phished, reused, and dumped. We replaced them entirely with passkeys and one-time email links — here is how each works and why the tradeoff is worth it.
BTCGOLD has no password field. There is no "forgot password" link because there is nothing to forget. You sign in one of two ways: with a passkey on a device you already own, or with a one-time link sent to your email. That is the whole surface area.
This is a deliberate choice, not a missing feature. Passwords are the single most exploited weakness in consumer software, and a small site like this one has no business asking users to manage another one.
Why we removed the password
Three things go wrong with passwords, every time, on every site:
1. They get reused. The average person reuses the same handful of passwords across dozens of accounts. A breach at any one of those sites — a forum from 2014, a dead SaaS tool, a streaming service — leaks the credential, and credential-stuffing bots try it everywhere else. We could not protect you from that even if our own database stayed perfect forever.
2. They get phished. A convincing-looking login page on a typo'd domain captures the password in plain text. The user is back at the real site five seconds later, noticing nothing. Multi-factor codes get phished the same way through real-time relay attacks.
3. They make our database a target. A password store — even a properly hashed one — is a thing attackers want. If we never store the secret, we cannot leak the secret. The safest database is the one that does not exist.
Door #1: Passkeys
A passkey is a public/private key pair generated on your device — usually your phone, laptop, or a hardware key. The public half is stored on our server. The private half never leaves your device and is gated behind your fingerprint, Face ID, or device PIN.
When you log in, our server sends a random challenge. Your device signs it with the private key, after confirming it is really you, and sends the signature back. We verify it with the public half. That is the entire handshake.
Two properties make this radically better than a password:
Phishing-resistant by design. The passkey is bound to our exact domain. A look-alike phishing site cannot trigger the signing flow because the browser refuses to release the credential for a different origin. There is no human judgment call about whether a URL "looks right."
Nothing useful to steal from our database. The public key sitting on our server is worthless on its own. An attacker who dumps our entire user table walks away with a list of public keys they cannot do anything with.
We implement passkeys with the WebAuthn standard — the same primitive Google, Apple, and Microsoft use for their own accounts. It is the most boring possible choice, which is exactly what authentication code should be.
Door #2: Magic links
Not everyone wants to set up a passkey, and not every device makes it easy. So the second door is a magic link: you type your email, we send a short-lived one-time link, you click it, you are signed in.
This shifts the security boundary to your email account. That is a deliberate trade: your email provider — Google, Apple, Fastmail, Proton — has a security team, mandatory 2FA, abuse detection, and account recovery flows that are far better than anything we could build. We are letting them handle the hard part.
The links expire quickly and are single-use. Forwarding one to a friend will not give them access if you have already clicked it, and an intercepted link goes stale fast enough that real-time attacks need to be fully automated to be useful.
The honest tradeoffs
No system is free. Here is what you are giving up.
Lost device, no backup passkey. If your only passkey lives on a phone that ends up at the bottom of a lake, you fall back to the magic link. As long as you still have email, you still have an account. We recommend registering more than one passkey — a phone and a laptop, or a phone and a hardware key — for the same reason you keep a spare house key.
Email account compromise = account compromise. If someone owns your email, they own everything attached to it, including this. That is true on every site that supports password resets, so it is not unique to magic links — but it is honest to name it. Your email password and 2FA setup are the real perimeter.
Email delivery delays. Magic links rely on your mail provider delivering promptly. Usually that is seconds. Occasionally it is minutes. Passkeys avoid this entirely, which is the main reason we prefer them.
Why this matters for a macro indicator site
BTCGOLD is not a bank. We are not custodying funds. The blast radius of a compromised account here is genuinely small — at worst, someone reads signal data they could have paid nothing for anyway. So why bother with any of this?
Because security culture is built before you need it, not during the breach. A site that uses passwords today because "the data is not that sensitive" is a site that will still be using them when the data is sensitive. Starting with the right primitives — phishing-resistant, database-minimizing, standards-based — means we never have to migrate under pressure later.
It is also a small protest. The default consumer-software security model — passwords plus SMS 2FA — has been broken in practice for a decade. Every site that quietly adopts passkeys instead is one less password the world has to manage, and one fewer phishing target.
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